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Disease outbreaks of international public health importance continue to occur regularly; detecting and
tracking significant new public health threats in countries that cannot or might not report such events to the
global health community is a challenge. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Global
Disease Detection (GDD) Operations Center, established in early 2007, monitors infectious and non-
infectious public health events to identify new or unexplained global public health threats and better position
CDC to respond, if public health assistance is requested or required. At any one time, the GDD Operations
Center actively monitors approximately 3040 such public health threats; here we provide our perspective on
five of the top global infectious disease threats that we were watching in 2012: (1) avian influenza A (H5N1),
(2) cholera, (3) wild poliovirus, (4) enterovirus-71, and (5) extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis.
Keywords: epidemic intelligence; disease detection; epidemiology; global health; emergency response; CDC
Received: 14 February 2013; Revised: 15 May 2013; Accepted: 24 May 2013; Published: 3 July 2013
T
he spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) in 2003 provided a stark reminder that
novel pathogens could be transmitted along
international travel routes with unprecedented speed
(1,2). With the realization that an outbreak anywhere
in the world poses a potential threat to virtually all
countries (3), the US Congress in 2004 authorized
the appropriation of funds to establish a global disease
detection program, to be named accordingly, based
at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), with the aim of promptly detecting and
mitigating the consequences of emerging infectious
diseases globally.
The Global Disease Detection (GDD) Program builds
on CDC’s experience in public health surveillance,
laboratory science, and outbreak prevention and control
(4). The program provides a platform to develop and
strengthen global capacity to rapidly detect, identify,
and contain emerging infectious disease and bioterrorist
threats. GDD program components include:
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1) an established network of CDC public health ex-
perts stationed in GDD Regional Centers located
in 10 different countries across all six World
Health Organization (WHO) regions to provide
ongoing technical assistance and training in various
areas including field epidemiology and laboratory
methods;
2) a cadre of deployable disease and refugee health
experts; and
3) a centralized global events operations center dedi-
cated to the support of two agency-wide functions:
global risk- and event-based surveillance (5) and
operational and financial support for a subset of
CDC’s international deployments in response to
events that meet specific criteria in the International
Health Regulations (IHR) Annex 2 (6,7).
The Division of Global Disease Detection and
Emergency Response is also the designated WHO
Collaborating Center for IHR Implementation of Na-
tional Surveillance and Response Capacity (6).
To address weaknesses or gaps in global public health
surveillance and response capacity, the GDD Operations
Center, modeled on WHO’s alert and response opera-
tions (8) and established in early 2007, serves as CDC’s
platform dedicated to monitoring global public health
events using event-based surveillance, which is a metho-
dology by which reports primarily from publicly available
sources and usually on the internet, are reviewed for
indications of any emerging threats to public health.
(5,6). The GDD Operations Center has a team of six staff
and a Director with professionally diverse backgrounds,
e.g., human and veterinary medicine, microbiology, and
epidemiology, and is situated within dedicated space
located within CDC’s Emergency Operations Center
(EOC), with which we liaise both during GDD Opera-
tions Center supported international deployments of
CDC teams and also when the EOC is activated to
respond to an international disease event. Both official
information sources, e.g., ministries of health or agri-
culture and WHO, as well as unofficial and unverified
reports from media sources are reviewed. The latter
are verified through a global network of public health
professionals. Information sharing is built on trust and an
understanding of how to appropriately handle informa-
tion, particularly when it is not in the public domain
and disclosure could harm relationships with partners.
Information about disease events also comes from
CDC subject matter experts in both the United States
and those assigned to programs abroad. We also utilize
disease-specific sources, which are particularly useful
with regard to pathogens that typically are laboratory-
confirmed prior to reporting (e.g., influenza, polio), and
although laboratory confirmation may result in delays,
such etiology-specific sources typically are rapid in
reporting verified cases. We monitor outbreaks from
infectious and non-infectious causes including those
attributable to disasters, intoxications, and chemical,
radiological, or nuclear releases. We also monitor out-
breaks of unknown etiology, many of which are later
determined to have an infectious cause. Outbreaks among
animals may also come under surveillance for known
zoonotic diseases and to assess signals that may herald
emerging or re-emerging outbreaks of human disease.
Regardless of the type of outbreak or public health event,
increased awareness of such an occurrence is critical for
rapid public health response. Finally, the GDD Opera-
tions Center’s outbreak response contingency fund pro-
vides financial support to CDC programs that makes
possible a prompt response to international requests for
assistance.
The GDD Operations Center monitors approximately
3040 public health threats each day. However, we most
closely watch threats of particular concern to the global
public health community, and more specifically, those
threats that could develop into a public health emergency
of international concern to which CDC may be asked
to respond bilaterally by the country experiencing the
outbreak, through the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN), or via both routes.
GOARN is a formalized mechanism by which multiple
institutions are able to provide outbreak assistance that is
coordinated through WHO (7,8). With this perspective,
we describe five of the top global infectious disease
threats that we were watching in the GDD Operations
Center during 2012. The GDD Operations Center is a
response-driven organization, and accordingly, we also
provide information here describing to which of these
threats CDC responded to between January 2007 and
August 2012 in the form of deploying subject matter
experts, e.g., epidemiologists and/or laboratorians at the
request of a country experiencing an acute outbreak of
illness (Table 1). These five top threats of 2012 were based
on subjective judgment regarding future risk based on
input from pertinent subject matter experts across CDC
and the GDD Operations Center’s expertise in conduct-
ing early warning surveillance through monitoring of
global health events, and not on an analytical algorithm
or quantitative method. Factors considered for selection
included high transmissibility, disease burden and sever-
ity; established or pandemic potential; disease eradica-
tion; and lack of available preventive or treatment
interventions. While these five diseases were selected,
there were many other noteworthy diseases such as
plague, yellow fever, novel coronaviruses, that were
closely monitored during 2012. The same judgment is
being applied to evaluate which threats to monitor during
2013, for which a follow-up report will be written.
The rationale for the selection of each for 2012 is
provided below:
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Five top infectious disease threats, 2012
Avian influenza A (H5N1)
Avian influenza A (H5N1) was first reported to infect a
human in 1997 in Hong Kong; 6 additional confirmed
and 2 possible cases were reported in Hong Kong during
the subsequent 7 months (9) and ultimately resulted in a
total of 18 cases with 6 deaths (10). Since its emergence,
this virus has been associated with continuing sporadic
cases and small clusters and a high case-fatality pro-
portion of 59% in humans. While the virus has not yet
developed the capacity to spread easily from humans to
humans, if it were to do so, the combination of greater
transmissibility between humans, the lack of pre-existing
immunity in the population, and high case-fatality
proportion has the potential to cause substantial global
mortality (10). Significant progress has been made world-
wide over the past decade in the ability to rapidly detect
and respond to the emergence of such a pathogen. While
the response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic demonstrated
this growing global capacity, the potential for greater
severity associated with an influenza H5N1 pandemic
would be a much greater challenge. During 2012,
outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1
have continued to be reported in poultry, most recently
confirmed in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Chinese
Taipei, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Myanmar, Nepal, and Vietnam (11). During 2012,
32 human infections with H5N1 influenza were reported
from Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Indonesia,
and Vietnam; most were associated with exposure to
poultry, and 20 (62.5%) of these cases were fatal (12).
Although influenza H5N1 remains poorly transmissible
among humans, recently published research highlights
the potential for mutations that would yield greater
transmissibility among mammals (1315). In addition
to influenza H5N1, we continue to watch for reports
of other novel influenza subtypes being reported.
For example, the GDD Operations Center closely moni-
tored pandemic A (H1N1) 2009 virus infection (2009
H1N1), which was first detected in April 2009 and spread
rapidly across the world. Additionally, during 2012 we
began monitoring an outbreak of highly pathogenic
influenza H7N3 among poultry in Mexico first reported
in June, which was subsequently associated with two non-
fatal influenza infections in humans (16). Because the
GDD Operations Center’s surveillance activities are
solely international, we did not monitor, for example,
cases of influenza A (H3N2) associated with swine in
the United States; however, with our surveillance techni-
ques we would be able to identify cases of novel influenza
that occur outside the United States, such as the above
example of H7N3 in Mexico. Figure 1 depicts CDC
international responses to countries’ requests for assis-
tance to cases or outbreaks of influenza H5N1 and 2009
H1N1 which occurred from January 2007 to August
2012.
Cholera
Cholera warrants a place within five of the top global
infectious disease threats list due to its long-established
and continuing ability to infect and kill large numbers of
people in a very short time. More than 100 years after the
discovery of Vibrio cholerae and its role in human
outbreaks, cholera continues to disrupt global public
health. In 2011, 58 countries reported 589,854 cases of
cholera and 7,816 cholera deaths to WHO (17). In 2010
Table 1. Bilateral international deployments in response to CDC’s five top global infectious disease threats and pandemic A (H1N1)
2009, January 2007August, 2012
Year Disease Countries
2007 H5N1 Cambodia, Nigeria, Pakistan
2008 Polio Angola, Anguilla
2008 Cholera Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Zimbabwe
2009 Pandemic A (H1N1) 2009 Argentina, Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kenya,
Mexico*, Nicaragua, Peru, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Ukraine
2009 Polio Benin, Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda
2009 XDR-TB Namibia
2010 Cholera Cameroon, Haiti, Dominican Republic
2010 Polio People’s Republic of the Congo
2011 Enterovirus-71 Vietnam
2011 H5N1 Bangladesh
2011 Polio Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali
2012 Cholera Sierra Leone*
2012 Enterovirus-71 Cambodia
*Multilateral deployment through GOARN.
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and 2011, most cases were reported by Haiti, but in the
previous decade, most indigenous cases of cholera
reported to WHO were from sub-Saharan Africa (18).
In 2009, an outbreak of over 100,000 cases occurred
in Zimbabwe, and subsequently spread to neighboring
South Africa and Zambia, causing thousands of addi-
tional cases (19). During 2012, the GDD Operations
Center monitored outbreaks of cholera, in chronologi-
cal order, in Haiti, Dominican Republic, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Angola, Uganda,
Sierra Leone, Republic of Congo, Guinea, Ghana,
Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Niger, and the
Philippines. In the United States and other developed
countries with robust water and sanitation infrastructure,
widespread outbreaks of cholera are unlikely to pose a
significant threat to public health; however, cholera
remains important to the global community because of
its efficient transmission across vulnerable populations in
countries with less well-developed infrastructure. Despite
the low risk from epidemic cholera, it remains a threat
in the Western Hemisphere: between January 1991 and
December 1993, epidemic cholera spread through-
out Latin America after first being introduced into
Peru; over 1,300,000 cases and over 11,000 deaths were
reported from the region between 1991 and 1996 before
the epidemic ended (20). More recently, cholera has been
reported from Haiti for the first time (21,22). Since the
beginning of the outbreak in Haiti in October 2010
through the end of 2012, 635,980 cases and 7,912
deaths have been attributed to cholera (23). In November
2010, suspected cases of cholera were first reported from
adjacent Dominican Republic, and from the first week
of January 2011 to mid-December 2012, there were
28,571 cases of cholera with 418 deaths associated with
this outbreak in that country (24). Cases associated
with a wedding in the Dominican Republic in 2011
were reported from Venezuela, Spain, Mexico, and the
United States (25), and cases among travelers return-
ing to or coming from Haiti have been reported in the
United States, Canada, Brazil, and the Bahamas (17,26).
Additionally, an outbreak of cholera in July 2012 in
Granma Province, Cuba attributed to the same serotype
found in Haiti and the Dominican Republic: V. cholera,
serogroup O1, serotype Ogawa, Biotype El Tor indicates
potential spread from Hispaniola (27). Figure 2 depicts
CDC’s international responses to outbreaks of cholera
from January 2007 to August 2012.
Poliomyelitis (polio)
Polio’s most visible current-day legacy is the permanently
paralyzed victims on the streets of affected countries
worldwide. In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved
to eradicate polio and as a result the global incidence of
polio associated with wild polioviruses decreased from an
estimated 350,000 cases in 1998 to 1,997 cases in 2006,
and subsequently to 222 cases reported as of January 22,
2013 (symptom onset during 2012, reported in January
2013) (28,29). The number of countries that continue
to have endemic circulation of polio has been reduced
to three: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. Although
transmission of types 1 and 3 polio continue to be
reported, albeit in declining numbers, wild type 2 polio
virus circulation was last reported in October 1999 (30)
from Aligarh, Western Uttar Pradesh, India (31). The
elimination of type 2 polio was a milestone for the Global
Polio Eradication Initiative, which allowed strategies
to focus on the eradication of poliovirus types 1 and 3
(30,32). In December 2011, the CDC Director activated
the CDC Emergency Operations Center for the final
push toward eradication. Eradicating the final 0.06%
of polio is likely to be the greatest challenge. In the
GDD Operations Center we monitor not only countries
Fig. 1. CDC’s international responses to H5N1 avian influenza and influenza H1N1-2009*January 2007August 2012.
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with endemic circulation, but also countries that report
imported cases, which during 2012 was limited to Chad
(28). Figure 2 shows CDC’s international responses to
requests for assistances by countries experiencing cases or
outbreaks of polio from January 2007 to August 2012,
as reported to the GDD Operations Center. The im-
portance of monitoring polio infections is critical now
and will continue to be paramount in the post-eradication
era, as even one case will represent an international
public health emergency.
Enterovirus-71
First described in 1974, this pathogen is similar to polio
in its propensity to cause very severe neurologic disease.
Beginning in 1997, it has caused widespread outbreaks
across parts of Asia. Even though evidence of entero-
virus-71 (EV-71) circulation in many other parts of the
world is now being documented, with the first cases even
preceding the case identified in California in 1969, the
remainder of the world has only occasionally experienced
the large outbreaks that have been seen in countries of
Southeast Asia (33,34). Because of the lack of an effective
treatment or vaccine, and because contact transmission
in school and day care settings allows for efficient spread,
these recent outbreaks of severe and fatal EV-71 disease
across parts of Asia are a cause for concern. A notable
feature of these recent outbreaks due to EV-71 is the
severe and fatal disease among young children. The
primary clinical manifestations include non-specific
febrile illness and handfootmouth disease, but approxi-
mately 2 in 10,000 children experience severe morbidity
including brainstem encephalitis, pulmonary edema, and
hemorrhage; to date, there is no explanation as to why
some children develop more severe outcomes. Although
several genetic lineages of virus are distinguished, there
is no specific marker of higher pathogenicity and a range
of genetic strains caused devastating outbreaks in the
2000s in Malaysia (35), China, and Taiwan (36). The fact
that these strains are detected in many other parts of
the world contributes to the uncertainty of why these
outbreaks are more common in southeastern Asia.
More recently, large outbreaks of severe handfoot
mouth disease and fatal EV-71 have been reported from
Cambodia and Vietnam. The outbreak in Cambodia
was first identified in July 2012 as an outbreak of
unknown etiology. Sixty-one children aged 7 years or
younger presented to two different hospitals in Cambodia
with high fever and neurologic and/or respiratory signs
and symptoms. Of these patients, 46 died within 24 hours
of admission, and the majority of the others died within
3 days. The outbreak in Vietnam began in July 2011 with
a significant surge of cases being reported from the
south of the country, and by the end of December 2012,
there were over 148,366 cases of handfootmouth
disease with 45 deaths reported from 63 provinces,
with cases being reported from the north of the country,
indicating widespread distribution throughout the Viet-
namese population (37). Both of these outbreaks are
typical of the EV-71 outbreaks that have been reported
from the region. Figure 2 depicts CDC’s responses to
EV-71 in Vietnam (2011) and Cambodia (2012). A
geographically widespread outbreak attributable to a
highly transmissible pathogen like EV-71 requires close
monitoring and effective response.
Extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis
The global incidence of tuberculosis (TB) has been in
a slow decline since the early 2000s. However, TB
was responsible for 1.4 million deaths worldwide in 2011
(38). Additionally, the emergence and spread of multi-
drug-resistant (MDR) and extensively drug-resistant
tuberculosis (XDR-TB), first identified in Tugela Ferry,
Fig. 2. CDC’s international responses to polio, enterovirus-71, XDR-TB, and cholera*January 2007August 2012.
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KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa in 2005, pose a rising threat
to global TB control (39). Morbidity and mortality are
consistently higher among patients infected with MDR
and XDR-TB, primarily because of the delays in diag-
nosis, limited or no options for antimicrobial therapy,
complicated patient management and increased treatment
costs (39). In 2009, it was reported that in the United
States the cost of hospitalization for one XDR-TB patient
was estimated to average $483,000 (40). According to
WHO, by mid-2011, 84 countries had reported one or
more cases of XDR-TB (38) and in the United States, 6
cases of XDR-TB were reported (41). In impoverished
areas and vulnerable populations, the presence and spread
of a demonstrably efficient human pathogen that in some
situations has become almost untreatable with currently
available agents warrants careful observation. In 2009
CDC responded to cases of XDR-TB in Namibia in an
effort to mitigate further spread of illness (Fig. 2).
Surveillance for resistant TB among global migrants
and refugees is also imperative: in 2005, an outbreak of
MDR-TB was identified in US-bound Hmong refugees
from Thailand (42). Co-morbid conditions put vulnerable
populations at further risk. Drug-susceptibility testing for
first- and second-line TB drugs is unavailable in most
settings with high incidence of TB, thereby creating the
opportunity for emergence of XDR-TB when MDR-TB is
inadequately assessed for drug susceptibility, and, treated
inadequately (39). We include XDR-TB on the short list
of pathogens to be monitored closely because of its
potential for more widespread transmission. If XDR-TB
became widespread, its severity and the difficulty of case
management and infection control could cause consider-
able challenges for global public health.
Summary
This perspective describes five of the top global infectious
disease threats of particular concern to the CDC as a
‘snapshot’ of what we monitored during 2012 and will guide
subjective judgment when determining which threats will
be most closely monitored during 2013. It does not
necessarily describe those diseases that CDC finds most
important or those that require the most resources.
Fortunately, the majority of outbreaks remain localized,
and the global spread of a truly novel pathogen is rare.
AddendumJune, 2013
MERS-Coronavirus
Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses found in
animals and humans. In both populations, coronaviruses
cause a range of symptoms varying from mild, such as
the common cold, to those seen in more serious respi-
ratory illnesses in humans such as SARS. The Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
is a strain of coronavirus first identified in a specimen
from a 60 year-old man in Saudi Arabia who developed
severe respiratory disease, renal failure and died in June
2012 (43).
As of 14 June 2013, the total number of cases of
MERS-CoV stands at 58 with 33 fatalities, resulting in a
case-fatality proportion of 57%. These include 43 cases
with 27 fatalities in KSA; two fatal cases from Jordan;
two cases from Qatar; three cases with two fatalities from
UK; two cases and one death from France; two cases
from Tunisia; one fatal case from UAE and three cases
from Italy (44). Clusters of cases have occurred in health
care settings or among family contacts, but human-to-
human transmission has not been sustained within the
community (45).
This warrants close watching throughout 2013 because
this previously-unreported coronavirus is causing severe
illness in humans and the epidemiology of this pathogen
remains largely undescribed.
Avian influenza A (H7N9)
The first three cases of avian influenza A (H7N9) were
reported by the China Health and Family Planning
Commission to WHO on 31 March 2013 after testing
negative for influenza A (H3N2), pandemic A (H1N1)
2009, and A (H5N1), as well as MERS-CoV. The cases
were reported from Shanghai (2) and Anhui province (1);
all three cases were severe and two patients died (46).
As of 14 June 2013, there have been 132 cases with
39 deaths attributable to avian influenza A (H7N9)
reported by China to WHO (47). Cases have not been
reported outside of China and to date there is no evidence
of sustained human-to-human transmission. One study
investigating potential sources of exposure found an
epidemiologic link between confirmed cases and direct
exposure to poultry or live poultry markets (48). Further,
reports of incident cases have declined since the closure of
live poultry markets; however, it is unclear whether this
decline is attributable to market closures, warmer weather
in China, or other factors (49).
Like H5N1, avian influenza A (H7N9) presents the risk
that it could develop mutations that confer the ability to
spread efficiently between humans. This, along with the
presumed lack of pre-existing immunity among humans,
could lead to a global pandemic. With this, avian
influenza A (H7N9) warrants watching throughout 2013
because like MERS-CoV, the epidemiology of avian
influenza H7N9 is not well understood.
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